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The rationale for the need for the state to intervene to protect children from abuse focusses on
the welfare of the child. Less attention is given to the ramifications for parents who are
suspected of abuse, but where no evidence of abuse is found, or where evidence is inconclusive.
Severe and long-lasting harm can be caused by the investigative state processes such parents
undergo. In such situations parents may seek redress. Although the question of remedies in
relation to harm caused by public family law processes inevitably concerns discussion of the
appropriate balance between state powers and private remedies, such discussion tends to focus
on the later stages of the child protection process. The question of harm is not adequately
addressed, particularly in cases where there is insufficient evidence to progress beyond
investigation. Specific provision for adequate remedy that does not upset the balance between
state powers and private rights is indicated.
The development of legal protection for children to protect them from parental harm has
undoubtedly been influenced by high profile child abuse fatalities and disclosures of historical
abuse. Indeed, it has been argued that ‘the media have appeared, at times, to have more
influence on child protection policy and practice than professionals working in the field’.1 Less
attention has been given to the complexities and difficulties facing parents who are accused of
child abuse, or who are considered to be at high risk of abusing their child, but against whom
no evidence of abuse is substantiated.
Measures to protect children are adopted worldwide but the principles on which these
measures are based differ. The Anglo-American model is used in England, Canada, America,
New Zealand and Australia.2 This approach prioritises child welfare and child rights over the
rights of adults by intervening to protect the child where abuse is reasonably suspected.3 This
model does not make specific provision for protection, remedy or resolution for those wrongly
accused of child abuse. The state’s role is to act on behalf of the child.
Despite the policy drive in England since the mid-1990s towards early intervention, this model
of child protection does not have its origins in family support. It differs from the Northern
European model which focusses its attention upon the family as an inter-connected unit. This
approach accepts that families may require support in order to function appropriately and
seeks to provide this support at an early stage.4 Early intervention in England represents a
policy move towards this model but the legal framework remains one that prioritises the child’s
* Bristol Law School, University of the West of England, Bristol. Email: Lauren.Devine@uwe.ac.uk.
1 C Goddard and B Saunders, Child Abuse and the Media, NCPC Issues No 14 – June 2001 (Australian Government,
Australian Institute of Family Studies website), at p 1, available at: https://aifs.gov.au/cfca/publications/child-abuse-and-
media.
2 C Waldegrave, ‘Contrasting national jurisdictional and welfare responses to violence to children’ (2006) Social Policy
Journal of New Zealand 27 (March).
3 Under the provisions of Children Act 1989, s 47.
4 M Hill et al, International perspectives on child protection (Scottish Executive, 2002).
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interests, creating tension between welfare and regulatory priorities.5 Consequently the legis-
lation and statutory guidance does not provide parents with a specific remedy for harm caused
by the experience of being investigated by the state for suspected child abuse.6 However, serious
parental harm during and following state welfare processes of acting on suspicions of child
abuse is evident in research findings worldwide.7 This raises the question of whether there are
adequate remedies available for parents in this position.
Allegations and concerns about child welfare are required to be passed to local authority
children’s social care departments by any person or body having a duty to safeguard children
under section 11 of the Children Act 2004. Referrals can be made voluntarily by anyone else.
The notification to the local authority will be categorised as requiring no further action, or as a
referral requiring assessment.8 Assessment entails a very detailed and invasive investigation of
the child and their family, carried out by social workers. At the end of the investigation, social
work observations and impressions are collated about every aspect of a family’s personal lives.9
The information informs a decision about what, if any, action should be taken to protect the
child.10
Not all referrals amount to allegations but many do. Those that do not amount to allegations
include self-referrals from parents asking for social work help, and families who are referred
because they require services. Both fall under the ‘children in need’ provisions of section 17 of
the Children Act 1989. Those that do amount to allegations include suspicions of conduct
amounting to significant harm towards children, described as ‘child abuse’ in the guidance. The
guidance sets out four categories of abuse: physical abuse, sexual abuse, emotional abuse and
neglect.11 The assessment looks for inter alia evidence of abuse in all categories regardless of
whether the trigger for the referral includes an allegation, or is simply a request for supportive
services.12 It is thus an assessment for both welfare and policing purposes. This model of
assessment requires the assessor to assume a dual role, creating the welfare/policing dichotomy
evident in social work assessment policy and practice.13
The assessment framework has its roots in consensual welfare policy. It was designed to be used
in the Framework for the Assessment of Children in Need and their Families14 to help social
workers assess with a family what support they needed under section 17 of the Children Act
1989. As a consequence of its adoption in the statutory guidance Working Together to
5 L Devine, ‘Considering Social Work Assessment of Families’ (2014) 37(1) Journal of Social Welfare and Family Law 70.
6 Children Act 1989; Department for Education, Working Together to Safeguard Children (HMSO, 2015).
7 See, for example, S Amphlett, Working in Partnership; coping with an investigation of alleged child abuse or neglect,
(Parents Against Injustice, 1991); D Howitt, Child abuse errors: when good intentions go wrong (Prentice-Hall, 1992);
H Cleaver and P Freeman, Parental perspectives in cases of child abuse (HMSO, 1995); M Bell, Child protection: Families
and the conference process (Ashgate, 1995); M Bell, ‘Promoting children’s rights through the use of relationship’ (2002)
7(1) Child and Family Social Work 1; T Spratt and J Callan, ‘Parents’ views on social work interventions in child welfare
cases’ (2004) 34 British Journal of Social Work 199; L Davies, Protecting Children – A Critical Contribution to Policy and
Practice Development (London Metropolitan University, PhD thesis, 2010).
8 See the latest official statistics for numbers on how many fall into these categories: Department for Education, SFR
41/2015: Characteristics of children in need: 2014 to 2015, 22 October (DfE, 2015).
9 Department for Education, Working Together to Safeguard Children (DfE, 2015), at p 22.
10 Ibid, at p 37.
11 Ibid, at pp 92–93; for official statistics concerning types of abuse see: Department for Education, SFR 41/2015:
Characteristics of children in need: 2014 to 2015, 22 October (HMSO, 2015).
12 Department for Education, Working Together to Safeguard Children: A guide to inter-agency working to safeguard and
promote the welfare of children (DfE, 2015), at p 22.
13 L Devine, ‘Considering Social Work Assessment of Families’ (2015) 37(1) Journal of Social Welfare and Family Law 70.
14 First version: Department of Health, Framework for the Assessment of Children in Need and their Families (DoH, 2000).
Latest version: Department for Education, Managing individual cases: the Framework for the Assessment of Children in
Need and their Families (DfE, 2012).
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Safeguard Children,15 it is also used by social workers to gather evidence of parental
insufficiency. Despite its forensic role the framework lacks safeguards and controls analogous
to those which exist in criminal justice investigative processes: the focus is on the welfare of the
child not the rights of the accused. Following assessment, if the local authority decides it has
sufficient grounds, it can take legal action on behalf of the child by bringing a section 31 of the
Children Act 1989 action pursuant to a care order. This is an action intended to protect the
child, not an action against the parents. If successful, the order results in the local authority
assuming parental responsibility for the child. The standard of proof is lower than that of a
criminal court; public family law cases are decided on the balance of probabilities, not beyond
reasonable doubt. If suspicions remain but there is insufficient evidence to justify litigation, a
local authority can take action stopping short of a section 31 application. It has a variety of
processes at its disposal which effectively enables continuous and open-ended monitoring of a
family.16 Alternatively a local authority can offer consensual supportive services under section
17, or can decide to take no further action. The processes are set out in the Public Law Outline
2014.17
Parents facing assessment are thus in a difficult position in relation to their reputation, privacy
and autonomy. Although there is a clear argument that parents who are significantly harming
their children should not have the protection of the law in relation to processes that uncover
evidence of abuse, it leaves parents who are not harming their children in a vulnerable position.
This latter category of parents is significant. In 2014–2015 there were 635,600 families referred
and 550,810 assessments, the vast majority of which concerned alleged parental maltreatment.
The number of substantiated cases was 62,200, leaving 488,610 unsubstantiated.18
One of the reasons for the large discrepancy between substantiated and unsubstantiated cases is
the use of risk prediction. It is recognised that a child protection system that seeks to prevent
child abuse before it has taken place by investigating characteristics of families and children will
result in a large number of false positives.19 It is widely agreed that referrals based on third
party risk prediction creates a large number of ‘minnows that need to be discarded’ via social
work investigation.20 Despite this, referral on the basis of theories of risk prediction as opposed
15 Department for Education, Working Together to Safeguard Children: A guide to inter-agency working to safeguard and
promote the welfare of children (DfE, 2015).
16 Ibid, at pp 41–49.
17 See Ministry of Justice. Practice Direction 12a – Care, Supervision and Other Part 4 Proceedings: Guide to Case
Management, 16 May 2014, available at: www.justice.gov.uk/courts/procedure-rules/family/practice_directions/pd_part_
12a.
18 Numbers from: Department for Education, SFR 41/2015: Characteristics of children in need: 2014 to 2015 (ONS, 2015),
see ‘Main tables’. The criterion for substantiated cases follows the methodology of J Gibbons et al, representing those cases
where new Child Protection Plans (CPPs) were registered in the year. Formation of a CPP is the first stage of the process
where some evidence is required, thus providing the substantiation. Unsubstantiated cases are the class of cases where no
evidence is found. These terms can be contrasted with narrower definitions, for example the commonly used concept of
‘false allegations’. ‘False allegations’ refer to cases where the originating allegation is deliberately untrue. There is also
emerging literature on the wider concept of ‘wrongful allegations’, referring to unjust or unfair allegations, for example as
described in R Burnett (ed), Wrongful Allegations of Sexual and Child Abuse (Oxford University Press, 2016). These
concepts are of growing academic and public concern and link to broader discussions about the impact of allegations on
children. For example, the concept of ‘parental alienation’ has received recent attention in relation to the impact on children
of a separating parent making allegations of abuse against the other, in the process alienating the child from the accused
parent. This area is incredibly complex because of the difficulties of (a) establishing facts; and (b) establishing motivation of
the accuser.
19 K Browne and S Saqi, ‘Approaches to Screening for Child Abuse and Neglect’ in K Browne et al, Early Prediction and
Prevention of Child Abuse (Chichester, 1988), pp 57–85, at pp 70–71; J Gibbons et al, Operating the Child Protection
System: Studies in Child Protection (HMSO, 1995).
20 J Gibbons et al, Operating the Child Protection System: Studies in Child Protection (HMSO, 1995), at p 51.
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to disclosures by children has gained popularity since the refocusing debate of the mid-1990s.21
This has contributed to the significant number of parents against whom unsubstantiated
allegations have been made. If this policy is to continue, the body of evidence reporting that
parents and children can be seriously harmed by the suspicion of abuse and its investigation
suggests that this issue should be taken seriously.22
The following discussion concerns remedies that might reasonably be sought by those affected
by unsubstantiated allegations that have been investigated via the child protection process. The
analysis focusses on parents as they are the most likely to bring an action. Parents are likely to
focus on redress in respect of their trauma, particularly if the processes have involved the
removal of a child. The particular sensitivities surrounding parental suspicions of child abuse
will inevitably impact on parents’ ability to navigate the administrative and legal processes.
Remedies that may be adequate for minor, administrative disputes may not be so for deeply
distressed, fearful and traumatised parents who may still have caring responsibilities towards
the children they were suspected of harming. Remedies sought by non-family members are
more likely to be focussed on questions of reputation and privacy.
Complaints procedures and judicial review
Aggrieved parents may initially turn to the complaints procedure, or seek judicial review of
local authority decisions. It is a requirement under section 26 of the Children Act 1989 that:
‘(3) Every local authority shall establish a procedure for considering any representations
(including any complaint) . . . about the discharge by the authority of any of their
qualifying functions in relation to the child.’23
The complaints procedure can be used in relation to Part V of the Children Act 198924 and can
also be used in relation to assessments carried out under the statutory guidance. This process
has been shown to be effective in slowing down assessment, if not resolving a family’s distress.
Unfortunately this has a doubly damaging consequence: one of the reasons noted in the Serious
Case Review following the death of Khyra Ishaq to explain why social workers failed to
complete an assessment was that following their unsuccessful visit, Khyra’s mother lodged a
complaint with the local authority about the visit and the proposed assessment.25
Complaints procedures are not designed to address instances of substantial harm and distress to
families and therefore provide a very limited practical remedy. The process only has to consider,
not resolve. If the internal complaint does not provide satisfaction to the complainant, the
unresolved issues can be referred to the local authority ombudsman in relation to questions of
maladministration.26 Several evaluations of complaint processes conclude that complainants
21 Exemplified in G Allen, Early intervention: Smart investment, massive savings, the second independent report to Her
Majesty’s Government (HMSO, Cabinet Office, July 2011); and Department for Education,Working Together to Safeguard
Children: A guide to inter-agency working to safeguard and promote the welfare of children (HMSO, 2015).
22 See above n 7.
23 The ‘qualifying functions’ were originally complaints relating to Part III of the Act but were extended in 2002 to include
complaints under Parts IV and V. The complaints procedure is set out in the Children Act 1989 Representations Procedure
(England) Regulations 2006 (SI 2006/1783).
24 Children Act 1989, Part V deals with matters relating to the ‘protection of children’, as opposed to Part III which deals with
consensual family support.
25 J Radford, Serious Case Review Under Chapter VIII ‘Working Together to Safeguard Children’ In respect of the Death of
a Child Case Number 14, 26 April 2010 (Birmingham LCSB, 2010), at p 167.
26 In J Murphy, ‘Children in need: the limits of local authority accountability’ (2003) 23(1) Legal Studies 103, at pp 130–132,
Murphy explains that Children Act 1989, s 84 allows complaints to be referred to the Secretary of State for Health but this
is limited to an alleged failure of the local authority complying with its statutory duties under the Children Act 1989.
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had a high chance of dissatisfaction.27 There are also numerous government reports considering
reforms to the complaint system following claims of its inadequacy in sensitive situations in
response to research findings indicating that complainants do not obtain satisfaction.28 It is
therefore difficult to see how parents likely to be distressed and frightened will achieve
satisfaction as a result of a complaint.
Internal administrative remedies must be exhausted before an application for judicial review is
allowed, so families must use this process before commencing judicial review proceedings.29
Judicial review is intended to be used in relation to ultra vires acts by public bodies either in
relation to a decision, or failure to make a decision. Illegality, irrationality and procedural
impropriety are potential causes of action.30 They are therefore available for parents to use if
the complaint procedures have not resolved the issue. However, there is a very short
three-month limitation period for commencing actions, which creates an additional barrier for
potentially traumatised applicants who may also be litigants in person.
Judicial review decisions are limited by section 31(1) of the Senior Courts Act 1981. The court
cannot substitute different decisions following successful applications for judicial review.
Consequently, even a successful applicant will find a quashed decision is merely sent back to the
local authority for determination. The local authority is then open to the possibility of reaching
the same decision for a second time, this time using a different route. Under the Civil Procedure
Rules, Part 54, rule 54.19 the courts may quash decisions of public bodies, and either refer the
matter back to the public body and ‘direct it to reconsider the matter and reach a decision in
accordance with the judgment of the court’, or ‘insofar as any enactment permits, substitute its
own decision for the decision to which the claim relates’. Although redetermination is the most
likely outcome there are other potential remedies: quashing order, prohibiting order, mandatory
order, declaration, injunction and damages. Even if successful, of the range of potential
remedies it is redetermination that is the likely outcome rather than overturning of a decision,
rendering it an empty remedy for many families.31
Judicial review has been found to be very limited as a remedy in cases where the local authority
argues the applicant is a risk to children. Re S (Sexual Abuse Allegations: Local Authority
Response)32 highlights the problems faced by a claimant in relation to his challenge of a local
authority’s decision. The claimant, S, was a consultant gynaecologist who sought judicial
review of a local authority’s decision to conduct an open-ended risk assessment. His application
27 S Lloyd-Bostock and L Mulcahy, ‘The social psychology of making and responding to hospital complaints: An account
model of complaint processes’ (1994) 16 Law and Policy 123; J Coyle, ‘Exploring the meaning of “dissatisfaction” with
health care: the importance of “personal identity threat” ’ (1999) 21(1) Sociology of Health and Illness 95.
28 The Local Authority Social Services and National Health Service Complaints (England) Regulations 2009 (SI 2009/309)
implemented joint complaints procedures for health and social services from April 2009. The following reports are relevant
to both: K Simons, I’m not complaining but . . . Complaints Procedures in Social Services Departments (Joseph Rowntree
Foundation, 1995); Department of Health, Our Health, Our Say, Our Care (HMSO, 2006); Health Service Ombudsman,
Making Things Better? A Report on Reform of the NHS Complaints Procedure in England, National Audit Office (HMSO,
2005); Healthcare Commission, Spotlight on Complaints (HMSO, 2006); Department of Health, Learning from
Complaints: Social Services Complaints Procedure for Adults, Care Services Directorate, July 2006 (HMSO, 2006);
Department of Health, Supporting Staff, Improving Services – Guidance to support implementation of the National Health
Service (Complaints) Amendment Regulations 2006 (HMSO, 2006); Department of Health, Making Experiences Count: A
New Approach to Responding to Complaints: A Document for Information and Comment (DoH, 2007); Health Service
Ombudsman, Feeding Back? A Report on Reform of the NHS Complaints Procedure in England, National Audit Office,
October 2008 (HMSO, 2008).
29 R v London Borough of Barnet ex parte B [1994] 1 FLR 592 and R v Royal Borough of Kingston-Upon-Thames ex parte
T [1994] 1 FLR 798.
30 In Council for Civil Service Unions v Minister for Civil Service [1985] AC 374, Lord Diplock laid down that the reason for
a judicial review is that the body’s decision was based on either ‘illegality, irrationality or procedural impropriety’.
31 For a comprehensive research paper see: House of Commons Library, Judicial Review: A short guide to claims in the
Administrative Court, 06/44, 28 September 2006 (HMSO, 2006).
32 [2001] EWHC Admin 334, [2001] 2 FLR 776.
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was refused. He had been acquitted in the crown court of four counts of indecently assaulting
the daughter, K, of the woman with whom he had been living. The jury was unable to agree on
another three counts. The jury directed the prosecution that a re-trial was not appropriate,
leading to a formal not guilty verdict. Despite his acquittal the claimant failed to gain
agreement from the local authority that they would not continue to risk assess if he were to
move in with his new girlfriend and her children. Scott-Baker J held that:
‘If Re H and Others governed the approach in cases such as the present the result would be
to prevent local authorities from carrying out effective and timely risk assessments. They
would be forced to take care proceedings to identify whether grounds for intervention were
present. This would be completely contrary to the principle of non-intervention in children
cases. I do not accept that a local authority has to be satisfied on balance of probability
that a person is an abuser before intervention is justified.’33
The judge expressed ‘a good deal of sympathy for someone in the shoes of the defendant’,34 but
drew the distinction between the need to establish facts on the balance of probabilities in
relation to care or supervision orders, as in Re H (Minors) (Sexual Abuse: Standard of Proof)35
and the requirement to investigate if a local authority has ‘reasonable cause to suspect a child is
likely to suffer significant harm’.36 In the former, evidence is adduced to prove on the balance of
probabilities that there is a likelihood of ‘significant harm’ unless an order is made. In the latter
the duty is on a local authority to investigate if it suspects there is a likelihood of significant
harm.
There is a difference in objectives and the relevant standard of proof between a criminal
prosecution and the duty of a local authority. Scott-Baker J observed that:
‘Acquittal in criminal sexual abuse proceedings does not mean that a local authority is
thereby absolved from further responsibility to protect the child who made the allegations
or any other children who may in some way be at risk. Far from it, the various statutory
duties under the Children Act must, if they are in play, be discharged.’37
Given the different standards of proof and underlying purposes of criminal prosecution and
social work assessment it is not anomalous that, following criminal acquittal, social work
assessment could be justified. However, one of the main tenets of the applicant’s argument in
Re S (Sexual Abuse Allegations: Local Authority Response)38 was an objection to open-ended
interference into private life without a clear process of resolution to bring it to an end. The
question of whether it is reasonable to be subjected to open-ended suspicion is a different
question to that of whether it is reasonable for someone acquitted in a criminal court to be
re-investigated under a different process. One way to address the problem is for findings of fact
hearings to take place in order to assess what can be established on the balance of probabilities.
However, with a finding of fact at first instance it is unlikely to be reconsidered on appeal. This
was reiterated in Re T (A Child) which did allow an appeal, but emphasised this was
exceptional, illustrating the difficulties in persuading the Court of Appeal to interfere with
findings of fact.39
For parents who have already undergone significant trauma with a local authority these may
not be realistic remedies. Using the complaint procedures followed by judicial review if the
33 Ibid, at [35].
34 Ibid, at [37].
35 [1996] AC 563.
36 Re S (Sexual Abuse Allegations: Local Authority Response) [2001] EWHC Admin 334, [2001] 2 FLR 776, at [34].
37 Ibid, at [37].
38 Ibid.
39 [2015] EWCA Civ 842, at [5].
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issues are not resolved may raise their fear of facing further assessment if redetermination is the
outcome. These remedies particularly do not help parents who find the local authority has
followed procedures correctly but that those procedures do not take account of their distress or
where the local authority argues there is an ongoing risk. Such an assertion is very difficult to
disprove.
Defamation
An important issue for parents and others suspected of child abuse is the question of their
reputation. Regardless of the reason for referral, an assessment relies on an assessment of
parenting capacity as well as looking at specific allegations of child abuse. Whereas some
parents may agree that an adverse assessment of their parenting practices may be a fair
assessment, others may not. This category of parent may be deeply upset by allegations,
opinions and personal comments which are recorded and shared with agencies having contact
with their child during the assessment, and stored following it. Children are recorded as
potential, if not actual, victims of abuse, and once a concern has been raised the family will be
categorised as a high risk in the future even if the outcome is ‘no further action’.40
This record is not, therefore, benign. It may influence the outcome of future interactions with
statutory services, and the standing of parents in their local community. It has long-term
consequences for the child, and although the majority of children who have been abused do not
maltreat their own children,41 the adult child is themselves categorised as being a high risk to
their own children.42 This approach and its evidence base43 has been heavily criticised by
Davies on the grounds that it is grossly unfair to victims of abuse who go on to have families of
their own. It is argued to create an aura of suspicion which is out of the subject’s control.44 It is
perhaps particularly unfair to children who have not been victims of abuse but who are
suspected to have been. In such circumstances it is unsurprising that defamation has been
considered as a potential remedy to expunge damaging allegations from records. The situation
was described in X (Minors) v Bedfordshire County Council45 as providing ‘fertile ground’ for
conflict between social workers and parents.
As a general principle statements made in the course of local authority assessments and case
conferences are covered by qualified privilege. The deciding case was W v Westminster City
Council.46 The local authority failed in its argument that qualified privilege could be extended
to absolute privilege in relation to statements made by a social worker in a child protection
conference. The grounds for the argument were that Taylor v Director of Serious Fraud
Office47 had established that courts could in principle extend absolute privilege to new
circumstances if the test of necessity was satisfied.48 The argument failed. It was held that if the
test of necessity were to succeed it would have to be satisfied in respect of statements made over
the whole range of the local authority’s responsibilities, including statements made to all those
40 Based on an observation of family characteristics of a sample of children on the Child Protection Register in J Gibbons et al,
Operating the child protection system: Studies in Child Protection (HMSO, 1995).
41 CS Widom, ‘Does violence beget violence?: A critical examination of the literature’ (1989) 106 Psychological Bulletin 3.
42 L Davies, Protecting Children – A Critical Contribution to Policy and Practice Development (London Metropolitan
University, PhD Thesis, 2010), at p 143.
43 See discussion in: B Egeland, ‘Breaking the Cycle of Abuse: Implications for Prediction and Intervention in K Browne,
C Davies and P Stratton (eds), Early Prediction and Prevention of Child Abuse (Wiley, 1988).
44 L Davies, Protecting Children – A Critical Contribution to Policy and Practice Development (London Metropolitan
University, PhD Thesis, 2010), at p 143.
45 [1995] 2 AC 663.
46 [2004] EWHC 2866 (QB), [2005] 1 FLR 816.
47 [1999] 2 AC 177.
48 Ibid, at 214.
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with whom the statutory guidance provided that information should be shared. That was too
wide a class of communications and of publishers for which the test of necessity had to be
satisfied.49
The case was considered exceptional. The claimants contended that the alleged recklessness of
the social workers in recording and sharing allegedly irrelevant matter was of a kind which
might be evidence that a communication was made for some motive other than a desire to
perform the duty in question.50 The question of malice turned on whether the defendants acted
bona fide in the discharge of their moral duty to raise matters of concern, or whether they acted
from some other unjustifiable motive other than a sense of duty. The test in relation to this
material was whether it provided evidence from which malice could be inferred. In this case the
argument failed.
Following W v Westminster City Council, although defamation remains available as a remedy
if malice could be shown, the threshold is high. W v Westminster City Council illustrates that
these circumstances are likely to be restricted and difficult to establish, so although the common
law appears to have maintained the ability of parents or children to use defamation as a
remedy, its use is restricted. Additionally, it does not address a fundamental problem of decision
making in public family law processes: it is the accuracy, or truth, of a statement in relation to
a child or their parent that is central to effective decision making, not whether a statement can
be made with impunity. Decision making in relation to child welfare on false or inaccurate
statements cannot lead to reasonable outcomes for children or their families.
The European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms 1950 and the Human Rights Act 1998
Jurisprudence from the European Court of Human Rights (European Court) in relation to the
effect of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms 1950 (the European Convention) and the Human Rights Act 1998 provides potential
remedies by ensuring actions of state bodies are proportionate and reasonable. Adequate
remedy is required to be available under the provisions of the Human Rights Act 1998. In
practice, these remedies have proved restrictive for parents from whom a child has been
removed. The provisions of Article 8 of the European Convention include non-biologically
related family, which reflects the rise in non-traditional families.51 This weakens the position of
biological parents in claiming return of their children as a remedy.
Article 3
Article 3 provides a remedy in respect of torture or inhuman or degrading treatment or
punishment. The principle has yet to be tested in relation to harm caused by the management of
unsubstantiated allegations, although if it is accepted that assessment is punitive the possibility
for an action exists.52 However, Z v UK found in favour of the applicant children in respect of
a breach of Article 3,53 suggesting Article 3 has limited use as a remedy in restricted
circumstances where the ground for an action is under-interference.
49 [2004] EWHC 2866 (QB), [2005] 1 FLR 816.
50 Ibid.
50 Ibid, at [67].
51 Human Rights Act 1998, Art 8 concerns the right to private family life, but ‘family’ is not restricted to biological family. See
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 1950 as amended by Protocol
Nos 11 and 14.
52 L Wrennall, ‘Surveillance and Child Protection: De-mystifying the Trojan Horse’ (2010) 7(3/4) Surveillance and Society
304, at p 309.
53 X (Minors) v Bedfordshire County Council; M (A Minor) v Newham London Borough Council; E (A Minor) v Dorset
County Council [1995] 2 AC 663, heard in Strasbourg as Z and Others v United Kingdom [2001] 2 FLR 612.
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Article 6
Article 6 concerns the right to a fair trial. The underlying principle is to ensure that individuals
are not denied the right to a fair trial before being categorised as criminals. The question is
whether the local authority is determining civil rights in relation to its management of
unsubstantiated allegations, in which case Article 6 applies and may demand external scrutiny
before a court:
‘In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against
him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an
independent and impartial tribunal established by law.’54
Whereas ‘the appropriate balance of power between courts and local authorities in section 31
care cases has long been debated’,55 the appropriate balance of power between parents and
local authorities in relation to cases that by their nature do not progress to a section 31
application has not been similarly considered. Although there is no case-law specifically in
relation to Article 6 and the management of unsubstantiated allegations, it is possible that the
assessment process may give rise to challenge.
With the exception of the possibility of using Article 13 to argue that the assessment process is
tantamount to a disguised decision against which there is no remedy, it seems that parents can
be tainted by serious stigma without right of redress.56 This was confirmed in the decision in M
(A Minor) v Newham London Borough Council57 which was heard in Strasbourg as TP and
KM v United Kingdom.58
The fact that there are procedural duties owed to parents under Articles 6 and 8 of the
Convention is a slightly different question. This issue was examined in P, C and S v United
Kingdom.59 However, this case was not limited to the assessment process, as in this case the
child had been permanently removed via a successful section 31 application, and had
subsequently been adopted. The applicants were a husband and wife and their daughter. The
daughter had been removed at birth with no plan by the local authority to reunite her with her
parents. The European Court found that there had been breaches of Article 6 and of Article 8.
However, the European Court said that it did not propose to attempt to untangle the opposing
considerations but confirmed that particular importance is attached to the procedural obliga-
tions inherent in Article 8. It could not be asserted that the daughter would not have been
adopted but for the flaws in the procedure, and consequently limited damages were awarded to
each parent for loss of opportunity. This illustrates the limits of the available remedies which do
not prioritise the integrity of the biological family: even where the decision-making process
which led to the removal of the child is recognised as faulty, the parents could not compel the
return of their child.
The use of Article 6 as a remedy seems to therefore be limited to cases of procedural
irregularity. In contrast, if a criminal charge is brought in relation to alleged child abuse there
may be some protection as the matter transfers to the criminal jurisdiction and the right to a
fair trial becomes a relevant consideration in the proceedings, as it is in public family law
proceedings.
54 Human Rights Act 1998, Art 6.
55 J Miles, ‘Mind the Gap . . . Child Protection, Statutory Interpretation and the Human Rights Act’ (2002) 61(3) Cambridge
Law Journal 533.
56 See, for example, the issues raised in: Re S (Sexual Abuse Allegations: Local Authority Response) [2001] EWHC Admin
334, [2001] 2 FLR 776.
57 [1995] 2 AC 663.
58 [2001] 2 FLR 549.
59 [2002] 2 FLR 631.
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Article 8
Article 8 concerns the right to respect for private and family life. The remedy is not absolute. It
is a qualified right and the judicial interpretation of the ‘paramountcy principle’ in the context
of equality applies.60 Under Article 8 any interference by a public authority interrupting respect
for privacy and private family life must be ‘in accordance with the law’ and ‘necessary in a
democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-being
of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals,
or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others’.61 As surveillance constitutes
interference into private life and consequently falls under Article 8,62 it is therefore relevant as
a potential remedy for surveillance of families. Surveillance is undertaken to identify risky signs
and characteristics in children and families, and also in respect of direct acts of the state
responding to these signs, and to specific allegations made in the course of a referral.
Article 8 as a remedy for child protection surveillance
The European Court now clearly recognises that the collection of information on an individual
by officials of the state without consent constitutes interference with that individual’s right to
respect for his private life, which is guaranteed by Article 8(1) of the European Convention.63
Although Article 8(1) gives citizens the ‘right to respect for his private and family life, his home
and his correspondence’, according to Article 8(2) interference with privacy and family life is
permitted provided it:
(i) is ‘in accordance with the law’;
(ii) serves one of the legitimate aims, for example national security, public safety, the economic
well-being of the country, prevention of disorder or crime, protection of health or morals,
or the protection of the rights and freedoms of others; and
(iii) is ‘necessary in a democratic society’ for the purpose in question.
There is case-law establishing that there are two requirements over and above the requirement
that interference must have some basis in domestic law:
(1) The law must be adequately accessible: citizens must be able to have an indication that is
adequate in the circumstances of the legal rules applicable to a given case. Secondly, a
practice cannot be regarded as lawful unless it is formulated with sufficient precision to
enable the citizen to regulate his conduct: he must be able to foresee, to a degree that is
reasonable in the circumstances, the consequences which a given action may entail. These
are principles of ‘fair labelling’;64 and
(2) Any law invoked as a basis for an interference with a Convention right must be ‘compatible
with the rule of law, which is expressly mentioned in the preamble to the Convention’.65
The legal rules in question must not allow for arbitrariness as this is contrary to rule of law.
This in turn relates back to the question of how precisely a legal rule is phrased as ‘the
60 Children Act 1989, s 1(1).
61 Amann v Switzerland (Application No 27798/95) (2000) 30 EHRR 843, at 47.
62 Ibid.
63 See I Brown and D Korff, ‘Paper No 4: The Legal Framework – an analysis of the “constitutional” European approach to
issues of data protection and law enforcement’ in Privacy and Law Enforcement, Study for the Information Commissioner
(HMSO, 2004).
64 Sunday Times v United Kingdom (Application No 6538/74) (1979) 2 EHRR 245, at 49.
65 Malone v United Kingdom (Application No 8691/79) (1984) 7 EHRR 14, at 67, citing Silver and Others v United Kingdom
(Application No 5947/72) (1983) 5 EHRR 347, at 90, and Golder v United Kingdom (Application No 4451/70)
(1979–1980) 1 EHRR 524, at 34.
52 Child and Family Law Quarterly, Vol 29, No 1, 2017
Click here to return to Main Contents
Watermark hook
domestic law must be sufficiently clear in its terms to give citizens an adequate indication as
to the circumstances and conditions on which public authorities are empowered to resort to
any such secret measures’.66
The principles apply generally to local authorities and government surveillance powers.
Legislation granting authorities the power to interfere with fundamental rights must be
formulated with sufficient precision:
(1) To allow individuals who might be affected to foresee, to a reasonable extent, how the rules
will be applied in specific cases, and
(2) To prevent the authorities in question from applying the rules arbitrarily.
If local authorities are granted discretionary powers, that discretion must be fettered: it must be
made clear when it is appropriate to use the discretionary powers, and when it is not. In
addition, there should be appropriate procedures to ensure that the rules are properly applied,
to which citizens should have access, and there should be adequate remedy.67 The requirements
are set out in Malone v United Kingdom:
‘The degree of precision required of the law in this connection will depend upon the
particular subject matter . . . Since the implementation in practice of measures of secret
surveillance of communications is not open to scrutiny by the individuals concerned or the
public at large, it would be contrary to the rule of law for the legal discretion granted to the
executive to be expressed in terms of an unfettered power. Consequently, the law must
indicate the scope of any such discretion conferred on the competent authorities and the
manner of its exercise with sufficient clarity, having regard to the legitimate aim of the
measure in question, to give the individual adequate protection against arbitrary interfer-
ence.’68
These principles, on the face of it, provide some remedy for families whose private data has
been collected and used without their consent. However, in establishing child protection
databases the government69 mistakenly relied on Peck v United Kingdom70 in respect of
allowing personal data exchanges on the basis of wide statutory provisions. In Peck personal
data on a CCTV tape on which the applicant could be identified was disclosed by a local
authority to the press, acting inter alia under a previous provision similar to Local Government
Act 2000, section 2 and Local Government Act 1972, section 111.71 Section 2 of the Local
Government Act 2000 allowed local authorities to do:
‘… anything which they consider is likely to promote or improve [the economic, social or
environmental] well-being of their area …’72
Anderson et al observed that this is one of the main provisions on which government and local
authorities base the sharing of sensitive data on children and their families, despite the
66 Amann v Switzerland (Application No 27798/95) (2000) 30 EHRR 843, at 58.
67 This procedural aspect of the rights protected by the Convention is increasingly acknowledged in case-law. This is consistent
with Art 13 of the Convention (notably the only substantive provision in the European Convention that has not been
included in the Human Rights Act 1998).
68 Malone v United Kingdom (Application No 8691/79) (1984) 7 EHRR 14, at 67–68.
69 Department for Constitutional Affairs, Public Sector Data Sharing Guidance on the Law – November 2003 (DCA, 2003).
70 (Application No 44647/98) (2003) 36 EHRR 719.
71 See Department for Constitutional Affairs, Public Sector Data Sharing: Guidance on the Law, November 2003 (DCA,
2003), s 3(26), referring to Peck v United Kingdom, ibid. Local Government Act 1972, s 111 states: ‘a local authority shall
have the power to do anything . . . which is calculated to facilitate, or is conducive or incidental to the discharge of any of
their functions’. For a detailed description of Peck, see I Brown and D Korff, ‘Paper No 4: The Legal Framework – an
analysis of the constitutional European approach to issues of data protection and law enforcement’ Privacy and Law
Enforcement, Study for the Information Commissioner (ICO, 2004).
72 Local Government Act 2000, s 2(1).
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provision being restricted in section 3.73 In addition, the main provision the Department for
Constitutional Affairs relied on was section 163 of the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act
1994,74 which allowed local authorities to establish CCTV systems in order to, inter alia,
‘promote the prevention of crime’.
Although it was considered by the DCA that these provisions, read together, were a sufficient
legal basis for the disclosure of data without the consent of the data subject, it cannot be
assumed to provide a sufficient basis for the disclosure of personal data, nor can it be said that
the broadest provision, section 111 of the Local Government Act 1972,75 is sufficient on its
own. Indeed, it is clear that the collecting of personal data (and especially of sensitive data)
constitutes:
‘ . . . an interference with the data subject’s private life, and that the disclosure of such data
will constitute a serious interference if it can have serious consequences for the data subject,
and (ii) that such interferences must be authorized in clear and specific legal rules relating
to the particular processing.’76
Also, in a case in which the HIV status of a citizen had been revealed it was held that:
‘… any State measures compelling disclosure of such information without the consent of
the patient and any safeguards designed to secure an effective protection call[s] for the most
careful scrutiny on the part of the Court.’77
Despite this, the DCA Guidance states:
‘If there are no relevant statutory restrictions it may then be possible for local authorities to
share data either internally or externally in reliance on Section 111(1) of the Local
Government Act 1972 or Section 2 of the Local Government Act 2000. The power that is
contained in Section 2 of the Local Government Act 2000 is of particular relevance as it is
designed to ensure that service delivery is coordinated in ways which minimise duplication
and maximise effectiveness.’78
Anderson et al concluded that this guidance was:
‘… not compatible with the EC Framework Directive on data protection. The guidance is
therefore mistaken in terms of EC, and thus (under the ECA) UK law. At the very least,
those conditions should be extremely restrictively applied, subject to special rules and
special safeguards.’79
If it is not in accordance with the law it is potentially a breach of Article 8. The extensive
sharing of highly sensitive data about children and their families, wider families and friends
involves:
‘… serious interferences with the rights of those children under Article 8 ECHR. Under the
Convention, such interferences must be based on legal provisions that are clear, precise,
foreseeable in their application and compatible with the rule of law. The same applies to
the sharing of data on parents, siblings and friends. Vague and open-ended provisions such
73 See R Anderson et al, Children’s Databases – Safety and Privacy, A Report for the Information Commissioner,
22 November (FIPR, 2006), at p 105.
74 Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994.
75 Local Government Act 1972.
76 See note 73 above, at p 106.
77 See note 73 above, at p 106 quoting from: Z v Finland (Application No 22009/93) (1998) 25 EHRR 371.
78 Department for Constitutional Affairs, Public Sector Data Sharing Guidance on the Law – November 2003 (HMSO,
2003), at Section 3.30.
79 See note 73 above, at p 120.
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as (again) Section 2 of the Local Government Act 2000 or section 111 of the Local
Government Act 1972 do not meet these requirements and cannot therefore legitimise the
data sharing in question.’80
Whether the government is acting ultra vires in its surveillance policies determines whether a
remedy is available under Article 8. This is a remedy which applies to all families in England; all
families are subjected to risk surveillance following sections 11 and 12 of the Children Act
2004, with the intention that risky families will be referred to local authorities and assessed.
Article 8 as a remedy for harm caused by the management of unsubstantiated
allegations
Demonstrating a breach of Article 8 is an important potential remedy. However, the qualified
nature of the right removes the absolute right to claim a breach under Article 8 in relation to
local authority assessment per se even when the grounds for a referral are unfounded.81 An
Article 8 breach may, however, have occurred if the assessment process can be demonstrated to
be flawed or inadequate. It is thus the way in which the process is carried out that could
amount to a breach of Article 8.
AD and OD82 illustrates some of the important issues. The case concerned an action brought
by a mother and her child in relation to lack of adequate risk assessment as the child’s
osteogenesis imperfecta (brittle bones) were not initially detected, leaving the parents open to
suspicion in relation to the child’s injuries. The child was placed in foster care whilst the local
authority prepared to apply for a section 31 order. This was only halted when an x-ray showed
the underlying medical condition following the child’s fall and admission to hospital whilst in
the care of the foster carer. The mother contended that she had separated from the father as a
result of the experience and that she and her child had suffered damage as a consequence.
At the time of her claim in the UK courts, the Human Rights Act 1998 was not in force and she
did not have a cause of action in negligence as no duty of care was owed to her.83 The child’s
claim in negligence failed as no recognised psychiatric damage was found to have occurred. The
European Court case was brought on the basis that mother and child had both suffered a
violation of their human rights under Article 13 read in conjunction with Article 8.84 The
Convention demands that parents have an effective remedy for any breach of their Article 8
rights. Section 7 of the Human Rights Act 1998 now provides a remedy for any breach of these
rights, but in this case Article 13 applied because the Human Rights Act 1998 was not in force
at the time the events occurred. It was held that:
‘The [UK] Government . . . accepted that it was arguably obliged to ensure that an
enforceable right to compensation was made available for such damage as could have been
proved to have been suffered as a result of any violation of Art 8 and that this complaint
should be declared admissible. As the applicants acknowledged, there was now an effective
remedy provided under the Human Rights Act 1998.’
In addition to the question over the adequacy of Article 8 as a remedy, its use may be restricted.
For example, Article 8 may provide a potential remedy only if an existing family relationship
can be shown.85 The meaning of ‘family life’ is thus relevant to establishing whether an
80 Ibid, at [7.3(7)].
81 Established in K v United Kingdom (2009) 48 EHRR 29, at 36, reiterated in AD and OD v United Kingdom (Application
No 28680/06) (unreported) 26 March 2010, at 68, 84.
82 Ibid.
83 Ibid, at 99.
84 Ibid, at 95.
85 See, for example, Frette v France (Application No 36515/97) [2003] 2 FLR 9, at [32].
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applicant has locus standi. This issue was considered in Marckx v Belgium86 in relation to
illegitimate children, establishing they held the same position as a legitimate child in relation to
their relationship with their mother. The position, however, is not the same for fathers, who
have to demonstrate the existence of family life between himself and the child and the mother.87
In addition to the negative requirement that Article 8 confers, Marckx established that there is
also a positive duty on the state to:
‘… act in a manner calculated to allow those concerned to lead a normal family life. As
envisaged by Article 8, respect for family life implies in particular, in the court’s view, the
existence in domestic law of legal safeguards as to render possible as from the moment of
birth the child’s integration in his family . . . a law that fails to satisfy this requirement
violates paragraph 1 of Article 8 without there being any call to examine it under
paragraph 2.’88
However, even if a breach of Article 8 can be established, the breach may be claimed to be
justified under Article 8(2) by arguing the action or violation to be ‘in accordance with the law’,
that ‘it pursued a legitimate aim’ and was ‘necessary in a democratic society’.
In relation to the balancing question of paramountcy and fair balance, Johansen v Norway
considered how a fair balance could be struck between the child and the parent’s interests. It
was recognised that the rights of the parents must be given separate consideration from those of
the child:
‘… a fair balance has to be struck between the interests of the child in remaining in public
care and those of the parent in being reunited with the child. In carrying out this balancing
exercise, the court will attach particular importance to the best interests of the child, which,
depending upon their nature and seriousness, may override those of the parent. In
particular, as suggested by the government, the parent cannot be entitled under Article 8 of
the Convention to have such measures taken as would harm the child’s health and
development.’89
Johansen has been followed in subsequent cases, although the fair balance approach has been
argued to be incompatible with the welfare principle as it is understood by the UK courts.90
Yousef v The Netherlands91 held that the interests of the child must prevail if a balancing of
interests is necessary:
‘… the court reiterates that in judicial decisions where the rights under Article 8 of parents
and those of a child are at stake, the child’s rights must be the paramount consideration. If
any balancing of interests is necessary, the interests of the child must prevail.’92
However, it was argued in the next paragraph of the judgment that this was not incompatible
with the rights of the applicant:
‘… the court has not found any indication that the domestic courts in striking the balance
they did between the rights of the applicant and those of the child, failed to take the
applicant’s rights sufficiently into account.’93
86 (Application No 6833/74) (1979–80) 2 EHRR 330.
87 Lebbink v The Netherlands (Application No 45582/99) [2004] 2 FLR 463.
88 (Application No 6833/74) (1979–80) 2 EHRR 330, at 31.
89 (1997) 23 EHRR 33.
90 D Bonner, H Fenwick and S Harris-Short, ‘Judicial Approaches to the HRA’ (2003) 52 International and Comparative Law
Quarterly 549, 582–583.
91 (Application No 33711/96) [2003] 1 FLR 210.
92 Ibid, at [73].
93 Ibid, at [74].
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Since Yousef, courts have reiterated the Johansen approach. There is judicial reluctance to
consider any erosion of the welfare approach, considering it to be compatible with the rights
approach, which places the child’s rights ahead of their parents and ahead of other children
who are not the subject of the proceedings.94 Herring identified fundamental differences
between the two approaches.95 Despite this, there seems to have been an assumption that
decisions informed by the best interests of the child will automatically conform to the
requirements of Article 8.96
Remedies are likely to be restricted to a small amount of damages. Successful parents will be
very unlikely to achieve the return of their child. It is generally considered to be in the child’s
best interests to remain with the adoptive parents so as to minimise disruption to children’s
attachment to their care-givers. This is not without contention, but is generally accepted in
welfare discourse.97 This is the consequence and importance of the wide definition of family in
relation to Article 8; it is not restricted to biological family but may be taken to include the
rights of a child in his new family following enforced placement elsewhere.98
In summary, the remedy undoubtedly exists but is inadequate to address the trauma suffered as
a consequence of surveillance, allegations and assessment. It has more relevance once a child
has been removed where the remedy is inadequate to realistically address the level of trauma
and irreversible disruption to family life.
Negligence
Case-law in respect of alleged negligence in child protection matters is pertinent to two key
issues:
(1) When and why a duty of care is owed to a child; and
(2) When and why (not) a duty of care is owed to the child’s parents and other adults.
Most negligence actions concern situations that have progressed to section 31 applications, but
there are some cases that exemplify the dilemma of parents, children and the state in relation to
the management of allegations. Conversely there are also cases where child abuse is evident but
the local authority failed to take robust action to protect children.
X (Minors) v Bedfordshire County Council99 concerned an interlocutory appeal against the
striking out of a negligence action on the grounds that the local authority inter alia failed to
take action under sections 17 and 47 to assess, investigate and take appropriate action. It was
struck out as having failed to disclose a cause of action by the House of Lords who did not
want to impose a duty of care on social workers and local authorities.
94 Re KD (A Minor) (Ward: Termination of Access) [1988] AC 806, 820 and J v C [2005] EWHC 1016 (Fam).
95 J Herring, ‘The Human Rights Act and the welfare principle in family law – conflicting or complementary?’ [1999] CFLQ
223.
96 See, for example, Re H (Contact Order) (No 2) [2002] 1 FLR 22 and Re B (A Child) (Adoption by one Natural Parent)
[2001] UKHL 70, [2002] 1 WLR 258.
97 This derives from attachment theory. See J Bowlby, Maternal care and mental health (Monograph, World Health
Organization, 1951); J Bowlby, Child Care and the Growth of Love (Penguin Books, 1953); J Bowlby, Attachment.
Attachment and Loss: Vol 1. Loss (Basic Books, 1969); J Bowlby, Loss: Sadness and Depression. Attachment and Loss
(Vol 3) (International psycho-analytical library no 109) (Hogarth Press, 1980). For an introduction to a critique of Bowlby’s
work, see M Rutter, ‘Maternal deprivation, 1972–1978: New findings, new concepts, new approaches’ (1979) 50(2) Child
Development 283.
98 Once children are considered to have ‘settled’ in a placement the courts are likely to treat the newly established
relationship(s) as paramount for the child’s best interests. See London Borough of Greenwich v EH and AA and A
(Children) [2010] EWCC 61 (Fam). For a typical review of the issues by the media where the courts are perceived to ‘go
horribly wrong’, see P Sawer, ‘Ombudsman could investigate child “snatching” by courts’, 6 March 2011, The Telegraph,
available at: www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/law-and-order/8363499/Ombudsman-could-investigate-child-snatching-by-
courts.html.
99 [1995] 2 AC 663.
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The negligence case was brought by five sibling claimants aged between three and one on the
grounds that the local authority had failed to investigate concerns. Various professionals had
reported the children to the local authority and had made recommendations but no action was
taken other than a case conference, despite both parents requesting removal of the children.
Following the mother’s threat that she would ‘batter them’ if they were not removed the
children were placed with foster carers and were eventually placed on the child protection
register in relation to neglect and emotional abuse. However, no application was made in
respect of a care order at that time despite the fact that the local authority accepted the children
should not return to the care of their parents. Some months later the local authority did apply
for care orders which were successfully granted. The children’s case was that the local authority
should have acted more quickly and effectively.
Four of the five siblings pursued the action as Z and Others v United Kingdom in the European
Court.100 This decision laid the groundwork establishing a duty of care in relation to social
work decisions and children. The originating action had been brought prior to the Human
Rights Act 1998 so the case was taken to Strasbourg which held that there should be a right to
a remedy, and that there had been breaches of private family life. Following this decision, it is
now established that a duty of care exists in relation to the duty of a local authority towards
children, but not in relation to their parents and other adults. It was held there were breaches
under Articles 3 and 13 of the Convention but no breach of Article 6. In relation to Article 3
there was a positive obligation on the government to protect children from inhuman or
degrading treatment. The authorities had been aware of the abuse over a period of years, and
had failed to bring this to an end. In relation to Article 13 there should be a mechanism
available to the victim or the victim’s family for establishing liability of State officials or bodies
for acts or omissions involving the breach of their rights under the Convention, including
compensation for non-pecuniary damage.
M (A Minor) v Newham London Borough Council101 was heard together with X (Minors) v
Bedfordshire County Council in 1994 and concerned the opposite problem, that of over-
interference. The legal issue, however, was the same: that of establishing whether a duty of care
exists between a local authority, children and/or parents. The claimants were mother and
daughter. The daughter was separated from her mother by social services because of allegations
that she had been abused by the mother’s boyfriend, which turned out to be incorrect. The
claim was also struck out on the grounds that no duty of care should be held to exist between
social workers and children or parents.
M (A Minor) v Newham London Borough Council102 progressed to Strasbourg as TP and KM
v United Kingdom.103 The applicants contended that there had been a breach of their rights
under Articles 6, 8 and 13. The claim under Article 6 was dismissed but it was found there had
been a breach of Article 8. It was further found that the applicants had been denied an effective
remedy, contrary to Article 13, as the possibility of applying to the ombudsman and to the
Secretary of State did not provide the applicants with any enforceable right to compensation.
The European Court awarded damages on the basis that the applicants suffered distress and
anxiety, and in the case of the first applicant, feelings of frustration and injustice.
Following these judgments further cases were brought in the UK in 2003 claiming negligence in
respect of social work acts and omissions which prompted the judiciary to reconsider the issues
100 [2001] 2 FLR 612.
101 [1995] 2 AC 663.
102 Ibid.
103 [2001] 2 FLR 549.
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and the considerable academic commentary.104 The facts in D v East Berkshire Community
NHS Trust; K v Dewsbury Healthcare NHS Trust; K v Oldham NHS Trust105 pre-dated
October 2000, so no claim could be brought under the Human Rights Act 1998, although in
the judgment Lord Phillips said that it was necessary to consider whether the introduction of
the 1998 Act had affected the common law principles of the law of negligence. All three cases
concerned instances of over-interference. Each case involved accusations of child abuse made
against a parent and in each case the accusations proved to be unfounded. All three cases were
turned down at first instance on the grounds that no duty of care was owed.
The claimants appealed to the Court of Appeal where Lord Phillips identified a number of
issues including: whether the position in X (Minors) v Bedfordshire County Council,106 and
M (A Minor) v Newham London Borough Council and E (A Minor) v Dorset County Coun-
cil107 had developed, and whether more recent authority had varied those principles; whether X
(Minors) v Bedfordshire could be distinguished on the facts; and whether a duty of care was
owed to both the children and the parents in each case. Lord Phillips concluded that the effect
of other decisions was to significantly restrict the effect of X (Minors) v Bedfordshire to the
core proposition that decisions by a local authority whether or not to take a child into care
were not reviewable by way of a claim in negligence, leaving the possibility for a different
outcome.108
As far as the position of the child was concerned, Lord Phillips considered that the decision in
X (Minors) v Bedfordshire could not survive the Human Rights Act 1998, although those
asserting that wrongful acts or omissions occurred before October 2000 would have no claim
under it. It would therefore no longer be legitimate to rule that, as a matter of law no common
law duty of care was owed to a child in relation to the investigation of suspected child abuse. It
was possible that there would be situations where it was not fair, just or reasonable to impose
a duty of care, but each case would fall to be determined on its own facts.
Having established the position in relation to children, the judgment turned to the position of
the parents. Although the position of the child in a common law negligence action had
developed under the Human Rights Act 1998, the position in relation to parents was very
different as it was held there were cogent reasons of public policy for concluding that where
child welfare decisions were being taken no common law duty of care should be owed to the
parents. Although decisions in relation to Article 13 established that parents and other adults
must have a remedy, it was held that it did not follow that they would establish the same rights
as children in relation to common law negligence: the fact that parents could establish a breach
of Article 8, and there were other remedies available to them in relation to specific situations,
for example defamation, meant they were not left without remedy. The rationale for the
decision was that the duty owed to children was in potential conflict with the interests of
104 The issues these cases raised have been considered extensively in academic literature. For example: M Johnson, ‘Public
authority liability in child abuse compensation claims – the X v Bedfordshire CC case undergoes a re-examination by the
Court of Appeal’ (2004) 1 Journal of Personal Injury Law 28; M Mildred, ‘Personal injury – psychiatric harm – parents –
children’ (2004) 1 Journal of Personal Injury Law 9; K Williams, ‘Abusing parents and children: negligence remedy not
afforded to parents’ (2005) 21 Journal of Professional Negligence 196; P Case, ‘The accused strikes back: the negligence
action and erroneous allegations of child abuse’ (2005) 21(4) Professional Negligence 214; E Gumbel, R Scorer and
M Johnson, ‘Recent developments in child abuse compensation claims’ (2006) 1 Journal of Personal Injury Law 21;
A Inglis, ‘Personal injury claims for child protection failures’ (2009) 29 Scots Law Times 173.
105 [2003] EWCA Civ 1151, [2004] QB 558.
106 [1995] 2 AC 663.
107 Ibid.
108 Lord Phillips also considered two New Zealand cases, Attorney-General v Prince and Gardner [1998] 1 NZLR 262 and
B v Attorney-General [2003] UKPC 61. In the latter case a claim by a child was allowed, but rejected in relation to the
father on the grounds that no duty of care was owed because he was the alleged perpetrator: the statutory duty on social
services was not imposed for the benefit of alleged perpetrators.
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parents. It was considered essential that the professionals should not be inhibited in acting in
the child’s best interests by concerns that they might be in breach of a duty owed to parents. It
would always be in the parents’ interests that the child should not be removed and thus the
child’s interests were in potential conflict with the interests of the parents.
In these cases counsel for the claimants attempted to distinguish the cases from X (Minors) v
Bedfordshire by arguing that there was a duty of care owed by the doctor to the child and also
to the parents. This argument was rejected and was held to be unrealistic because the initial
diagnosis of the doctor simply set in train the multi-disciplinary approach. The moment the
doctor suspected that the child had been abused, his duty to the child was in potential conflict
with the parents.
The decisions established that children who suffer harm as a consequence of negligent medical
diagnosis and social work interference do have a duty of care owed to them, representing a
significant shift in judicial policy. Although the position in relation to negligence has developed
in favour of children, who now have a remedy in common law negligence, their parents and
other adults do not.
The difficult balancing act that the courts were faced with has left the position for parents
unsatisfactory, despite their right to an effective remedy. The courts’ decisions have attempted
to resolve some of the difficulties surrounding whether, and in what circumstances, a claim
could succeed. They have also considered whether a failure to act on the part of a local
authority is actionable by children harmed as a result of the failure. However, the courts have
stopped short of providing parents with the same rights as children, the argument being that
they have other remedies they could use. The question of whether these remedies are effective
and adequate is open to debate given the scale of referred families and evidence of trauma and
harm potentially suffered by non-abusing parents.
Conclusions
The available remedies are drawn from a number of common law and statutory provisions.
Local authority complaints procedures and judicial review will not provide a remedy in relation
to local authority decisions unless there is a procedural irregularity in the manner of the
decision making. This may trigger a re-determination. Defamation is of limited help but only in
situations where malice can be shown. The circumstances where this is possible to demonstrate
on the balance of probabilities are likely to be rare.
In the case of common law negligence damages are restricted to children as parents have no
locus standi as a matter of public policy. The Human Rights Act 1998 offers some remedy
where processes have been breached, but the case-law has not addressed the apparent
incompatibility of the Children Act 1989 paramountcy principle. Damages are limited to small
amounts of monetary compensation which is of little assistance to families who have been
separated via processes later shown to have breached the rights of the parents or the child. The
rationale is the welfare principle, which has been interpreted to mean that once a child is
removed from their parents, a return of the child would be a further disruption and is not,
therefore, in their best interests.
These provisions offer limited remedies that do not adequately reconcile the level of reported
harm. Given the annually increasing number of referred families this is a growing and
immediate problem. The issues are particularly acute in relation to the dilemmas of parents and
claimants in cases such as Re S (Sexual Abuse Allegations: Local Authority Response)109 who
109 [2001] EWHC Admin 334, [2001] 2 FLR 776.
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could not bring an end to the suspicion surrounding him. The decisions also do not help
situations such as that which occurred inM (A Minor) v Newham London Borough Council.110
This leaves claimants, particularly parents, in an unequal position. Argument that establishing a
duty of care would create a conflict of interest for social workers, causing them to act
defensively are weak; a social worker acting in accordance with their statutory duty in a
reasonable and proportionate way has no reason to fear the consequences of a negligence
action. It is notable that in X (Minors) v Bedfordshire Lord Browne Wilkinson observed that if
a remedy in negligence were imposed on local authorities it would have a chilling effect on their
work and generally render them more cautious and defensive in their approach.111 This
approach, however, is directly at odds with the government’s view that public inquiries and
serious case reviews should occur in cases of under-interference which also render local
authority social workers more cautious and defensive. This is an unsatisfactory position leaving
a disincentive for under-interference and encouragement for over interference.
Simply denying the right to a remedy at common law does not address the serious question of
the harm caused and the impact on parents, children and society. It is not reasonable to deny a
remedy to a class of citizens harmed by negligent state interference, particularly where citizens
are powerless to stop such interference. This entrenched position is enabling a power imbalance
between state and family at odds with principles of reasonableness and proportionality.
The fundamental problem is that there is no process in the legislation or the statutory guidance
to assist parents who are caught in assessments and are harmed by them. These parents are left
in a ‘twilight’ situation where suspicion remains but there is no process of exoneration or
redress. The problem is therefore not adequately prioritised and considered in conjunction with
the processes of child protection investigations themselves. When the Children Act 1989 was
drafted the scale of referred families, now annually approximately five percent of families, was
not envisaged. Child protection processes have expanded into safeguarding with the introduc-
tion of the Children Act 2004. Successive versions of Working Together to Safeguard
Children112 have become more intrusive in relation to how families are assessed. More is now
known about the harm caused by referral and assessment, placing a responsibility on policy
makers interpreting how local authorities will carry out their statutory duties to ensure that if
harm is an inevitable consequence, then adequate remedy is available. The need for the
increasing number of families in this situation to obtain redress is consequently growing. It may
be that policy should address the plight of parents where allegations are unsubstantiated,
including providing specific remedies and ensuring sensitive treatment of such parents and
management of their data. If Government intent is to continue to adopt the child rights model
as opposed to the family support model whilst policy continues to lean towards the early
intervention model, discussion is indicated concerning specific remedy to address the piecemeal
development of remedies. This discussion should focus on the need to ameliorate some of the
tensions and distress for parents that are left following unsubstantiated suspicions of child
abuse, and the adverse impact on their children and family life.
110 [1995] 2 AC 663.
111 Ibid.
112 For the latest version see note 12 above.
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